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Jezdik v. State, 121 Nev. Adv. Op. 15, 110 P.3d 1058 (2005)1
EVIDENCE – REBUTTING CHARACTER EVIDENCE
Summary
This case involves allegations regarding fraudulent use of a credit card and
identity theft. Appellant Michael Jezdik (“Jezdik”) and the victim in this case, Anna
Behran (“Behran”), met in Las Vegas in early 1997. They enjoyed a brief romantic
relationship but soon parted ways. Approximately three years later, however, Jezdik and
Behran rekindled their friendship.
Behran told Jezdik that she wanted to purchase a home but did not know how to
do so. Jezdik offered to help Behran complete an online mortgage application at his
residence. Behran agreed. Throughout the mortgage applicatiosn process, Jezdik
acquired access to Behran’s social security number and other confidential information.
Approximately one month after Jezdik assisted Behran with her mortgage
application, Citibank received an online application for a MasterCard naming Behran as
the primary cardholder and Jezdik as the secondary cardholder. As the primary
cardholder, the credit card application required Behran’s social security number and date
of birth. The application, however, provided Jezdik’s address and stated that Behran was
employed by Southwest Advertising, Jezdik’s employer. At trial, Behran denied any
responsibility for the credit card application. She also testified that she never authorized
Jezdik to use her personal information to apply for a credit card, never used Jezdik’s
address to receive mail, and never worked for Southwest Advertising.
Citibank approved the application and sent two cards to Jezdik’s address.
Citibank’s statements went unpaid. Upon discovering the credit card account in her
name, Behran testified that she directed Citibank to close the account. As part of the
ensuing fraud investigation, Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department Detective John
Woosnam (“Woosnam”) contacted Citibank and learned that Citibank lost money on the
account. Woosnam obtained copies of three credit card receipts and billing statements
revealing seventeen purchases made during a two-week period. At trial, Woosnam made
a lay comparison of Jezdik’s signature on a copy of a voluntary statement with the
signature on the Citibank receipts. While not an expert, Woosnam testified that in his
opinion, the signatures were the same.2
At trial, Jezdik theorized that Behran opened the credit card account and used his
address and computer to complete the application in his absence. Jezdik testified that he
and Behran had renewed their romantic relationship and that Behran had complete access
to his residence. Additionally, Jezdik testified that he and Behran were indeed coworkers
at Southwest Advertising.
In an attempt to establish Jezdik’s credibility and good character, Jezdik’s
attorney asked him during direct examination “Have you ever been accused of anything
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Although Jezdik contends on appeal that the district court’s admission of lay witness testimony
concerning handwriting comparisons was improper, the court declined to reach the issue.
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prior to these current charges?”3 Jezdik answered “No.” Later, in the jury’s absence, the
State argued that Jezdik’s “no accusation” testimony “opened the door” to specific
rebuttal evidence regarding misconduct similar to that alleged in this case.4 The district
court agreed with the state and allowed two rebuttal witnesses to testify. A Detective
Olewinski testified regarding an unrelated ongoing investigation of Jezdik. The other
witness was Jezdik’s father-in-law, who testified that Jezdik once admitted to using his
personal information to open a credit card account without his knowledge or consent.
The jury found Jezdik guilty on one count of obtaining and using the personal
identification of another, three counts of fraudulent use of a credit card and two counts of
burglary. Jezdik appealed. On appeal Jezdik contends that Detective Olewinski’s and
his father-in-law’s testimony constitutes improper character evidence under NRS 48.045
and inappropriate impeachment evidence under NRS 50.085. The State argues, however,
that neither NRS 48.045 nor NRS 50.085 applies because the State elicited the testimony
to rebut Jezdik’s own testimony on direct examination.
Issue and Disposition
Issue: The main issue on appeal is “the extent to which the State may rebut character
evidence introduced by the defendant in a criminal case.”
Disposition: The Nevada Supreme Court concluded that that district court properly
admitted the State’s rebuttal evidence in response to Jezdik’s improper character
evidence during defense counsel’s direct examination of Jezdik.
Commentary
State of the Law Before Jezdik
Character Evidence Generally
NRS 48.045(1) governs the admissibility of character evidence in a criminal trial:
1.
Evidence of a person’s character or a trait of his character is not
admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted in conformity therewith on a
particular occasion, except:
(a)
Evidence of his character or a trait of his character offered by an
accused, and similar evidence offered by the prosecution to rebut such evidence . .
.5
Accordingly, NRS 48.045(1)(a) allows the defendant solely to decide whether to place
his character in issue.
NRS 48.055 provides the means for proving character under NRS 48.045. It
states, “In all cases in which evidence of character or a trait of character of a person is
3
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admissible, proof may be made by testimony as to reputation or in the form of an opinion.
On cross-examination, inquiry may be made into specific instances of conduct.”6
Generally, when a defendant elects to introduce character evidence in the form of
either reputation or opinion evidence, the State is correspondingly limited in its rebuttal
evidence and may only ask about specific acts on cross examination. That is not what
happened in this case. Here, Jezdik did not introduce evidence regarding his own
character in the form of reputation or opinion evidence. Instead, Jezdik put his character
in issue by testifying that he had never been “accused of anything prior to these current
charges.”7 Jezdik’s statement essentially denied any prior specific instances of conduct.
The “Collateral Fact Rule” and Attacking Credibility
Under the “collateral fact rule” it is improper to allow “the State to impeach a
defendant’s credibility with extrinsic evidence relating to a collateral matter.”8 Collateral
facts are facts that are “outside the controversy, or are not directly connected with the
principal matter or issue in dispute.”9 Notwithstanding these common law rules, under
NRS 50,085(3), collateral matters may be used to impeach a witness during cross
examination “with questions about specific acts as long as the impeachment pertains to
truthfulness or untruthfulness and no extrinsic evidence is used.”10
The court noted that the collateral fact rule is limited in its application. For
example, the rule does not control the scope of cross-examination. An examiner may still
question a witness any aspect of the witness’s direct testimony. Accordingly, the
collateral fact rule’s main proscription applies when “the witness to be impeached has
already left the stand and the former cross-examiner later calls a second witness or
proffers an exhibit to impeach the earlier witness’s credibility.”11 Consequently, the
collateral fact rule does not apply to a majority of methods of impeachment including
attacks on a witness’s motive for testifying and impeachment using criminal convictions.
It does apply, however, “when a specific contradiction is coupled with impeachment by a
prior inconsistent statement or impeachment using extrinsic prior bad acts not resulting in
a conviction.”12
Based on the foregoing, a specific contradiction using extrinsic evidence of a
prior bad act generally triggers the collateral fact rule in NRS 50.085(3). Yet, some
authorities have advocated an exception to the collateral fact rule when the State “seeks
to introduce evidence on rebuttal to contradict specific factual assertions raised during the
accused’s direct examination.”13 This exception, called the “specific contradiction”
exception, provides that a defendant’s false statements during direct examination “open
the door” to the admissibility of remedial specific contradiction evidence.14
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State of the Law After Jezdik
Before this case, the Nevada Supreme Court had not explicitly adopted the
“specific contradiction” exception. The court expressly adopted the exception in Jezdik.
As a result, Nevada’s statutory rules of evidence are interpreted to mean that a party is
not prohibited from introducing extrinsic evidence that specifically rebuts an adversary’s
proffered evidence of good character.
One question that remains unanswered after Jezdik is what type of factual
assertions “open the door” to the admissibility of specific contradictory evidence? How
much leniency are courts willing to grant a witness during his or her testimony before the
witness has “opened the door” to the opposing party’s use of extrinsic evidence?
Conclusion
The district court correctly allowed the State to specifically rebut Jezdik’s denial
of previous accusations on direct examination under the specific contradiction exception
to the collateral fact rule.

